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Before [January] 28th he really criticized us and wrote on his status:
‘Are you guys joking? A revolution through Facebook? What the hell,
there is no hope.’ And then the moment they shut down the
communications this person turned 180 degrees and said ‘OK, this is too
much, I am going to take to the streets.’ It was a changing point for him.1

I. INTRODUCTION
At approximately 12:30 a.m. local time on Friday, January 28, 2011,
the Egyptian government severed the nation’s Internet and mobile networks
in an unprecedented attempt to silence the voice of its citizens. The
crackdown was the first of its kind in size and scope,2 and was a reaction
against the Egyptian public’s widespread and enthusiastic embrace of
social media3 and digital technologies to share information, mobilize
support, and organize on-the-ground movements in opposition to the
government. Although the Internet blackout did not ultimately succeed in
quelling the demonstrators’ momentum, the desperation underpinning thenPresident Hosni Mubarak’s drastic act revealed the critical role that social
media played in fortifying the Egyptian Arab Spring movement.4
1. Egyptian activist Nora Rafea recounted the skepticism of her cousin in an interview on July
18, 2011, in Cairo. Paolo Gerbaudo, The ‘Kill Switch’ as ‘Suicide Switch’: Mobilizing Side Effects of
Mubarak’s Communication Blackout, WESTMINSTER PAPERS COMM. & CULTURE, April 2013, at 25,
34.
2. Comprehensive Internet shutdowns had occurred only twice before on a national scale—in
2005 in Nepal and in 2007 in Myanmar. See Masashi Crete-Nishihata & Jillian C. York, Egypt’s
Internet Blackout: Extreme Example of Just-in-Time Blocking, OPENNET INITIATIVE (Jan. 28, 2011),
http://opennet.net/blog/2011/01/egypt’s-internet-blackout-extreme-example-just-time-blocking. Egypt’s
Internet blackout demobilized nine out of ten Internet service providers, while one, Noor Data
Networks, remained in operation to provide access to the country’s stock exchange. See Christopher
Williams, How Egypt Shut Down the Internet, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8288163/How-Egypt-shut-down-the-internet.html;
see
also Transparency Report, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/traffic/explorer/?r=EG
&l=WEBSEARCH&csd=1295982520854&ced=1297503440991 (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) (providing
a visual representation of Internet usage in Egypt surrounding the shutdown).
3. The term “social media” as used throughout this Note will draw from the definition put forth
by Hunsinger and Swift, referring to “networked information services designed to support in-depth
social interaction, community formation, collaborative opportunities and collaborative work.” Jeremy
Hunsinger & Theresa Swift, Introduction, in THE SOCIAL MEDIA HANDBOOK 1, 1 (Jeremy Hunsinger &
Theresa Swift eds., 2014). Most forms of social media discussed in this Note involve a person-to-person
networking element, and all rely on the Internet or mobile networks for dissemination. “Social media”
and “new media” will be used interchangeably.
4. “Arab Spring” is a term frequently used to describe the series of pro-democracy uprisings and
revolutions that began in Tunisia in late 2010 and gained momentum throughout the Middle East and
North Africa in 2011. The uprisings came about as many public frustrations, societal inequalities, and
political abuses coalesced. Factors contributing to the movements included, but were not limited to,
corrupt authoritarian government structures, prevalent human rights abuses, economic instability, lack
of employment opportunities, a large youth population, a deep sense of deprivation and injustice, and
feelings of inspiration and encouragement generated by the success of the early protests. See JAMES L.
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The Egyptian protests began in earnest on January 25, 2011, when
tens of thousands of people filled the streets to demand the end of President
Mubarak’s regime. Inspired by the overthrow of the authoritarian
government in Tunisia a month earlier, Egyptians mobilized around “a
largely secular, nonviolent, youth-led democracy movement that brought
Egypt’s liberal and Islamist opposition groups together for the first time
under its banner.”5 The protests gained momentum as a result of Mubarak’s
electronic communication blackout, as the loss of connectivity further
alienated the generation of “Internet youth” and served as a tipping point
for many previously unaffiliated citizens who began to sympathize with the
movement.6 Ultimately, the Egyptian citizens proved to be a formidable
opponent. Mubarak stepped down on February 11, 2011, after eighteen
days of protest.7
While many scholars and commentators reject dubbing the 2011
uprisings a “Facebook Revolution,”8 there is no doubt that new media
helped facilitate the organization, mobilization, and publicity of the civilian
movement. Yet the human rights questions raised by the use of online tools
and governmental interference with Internet and mobile network
connectivity remain underexplored.

GELVIN, THE ARAB UPRISINGS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 1–30 (2012). It is important to
note, however, that the characteristics of the uprisings were diverse—goals differed from country to
country, spanning from reform to regime change, and means of demonstration ranged from peaceful to
violent. See id. at 31. Despite its common usage, some commentators have criticized the term “Arab
Spring” as misrepresenting the movements. One argument is that by drawing on comparisons to
previous political springs, the term construes the revolutions as fitting neatly into “a pre-existing
approved [Western] ideological narrative – the dictatorships of the Middle East are merely the latest in
a long line of tyrannies to have been undermined by the relentless march of progress and liberal
democracy.” Ed Rooksby, Summer’s Here and It’s Time to Call the ‘Arab Spring’ a Revolution,
GUARDIAN (June 14, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jun/14/arab-springrevolution. Another argument notes that the spring metaphor oversimplifies the movement, connoting a
spontaneous “season of renewal” that undermines the years of struggle and opposition endured by those
critical of the dictatorships. See Maytha Alhassen, Please Reconsider the Term “Arab Spring”,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/maytha-alhassen/pleasereconsider-arab-sp_b_1268971.html. In an effort to use more accurate terminology, one commentator
dubbed the events the “Dignity Revolutions” to reflect the most unifying element of all the uprisings: a
demand for the right to human dignity. Id.
5. David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html?pagewanted=all.
6. Gerbaudo, supra note 1, at 33–35.
7. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 5.
8. See, e.g., Bahgat Korany & Rabab El-Mahdi, The Protesting Middle East, in ARAB SPRING IN
EGYPT: REVOLUTION AND BEYOND 7, 14 (Bahgat Korany & Rabab El-Mahdi eds., 2012); Peter
Beaumont, The Truth About Twitter, Facebook and the Uprisings in the Arab World, GUARDIAN (Feb.
25, 2011, 3:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/25/twitter-facebook-uprisings-arablibya.
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This Note seeks to show the ways in which instances of Internet and
social media usage are indeed protected as fundamental human rights.
Using the Egyptian Arab Spring as a case study, this Note will address
three areas of inquiry concerning human rights.9 First, it will explore the
application of human rights protecting communication and affiliation—
including freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of
association—to Internet usage. Next, it will consider various impacts of the
Internet and social media on equality rights, addressing issues such as
discrimination, equal access, and women’s rights. Finally, taking into
account the pivotal role of private companies which provide Internet and
social media services, this Note will look at the human rights obligations of
non-state actors with respect to information and communications
technology, and interpret what is understood to constitute corporate social
responsibility under the reign of the Internet.
II. COMMUNICATION AND AFFILIATION RIGHTS IMPLICATED
BY THE USE OF THE INTERNET AND NEW MEDIA
In a 2011 report, Frank La Rue, the UN Special Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression,
noted that access to an Internet connection has not yet become a core
human right.10 Nonetheless, it is clear that the Special Rapporteur
considered the modern human rights landscape to be progressing toward
one in which equal access to the Internet should be fundamentally
preserved.11 Indeed, some nations have taken affirmative steps toward
recognizing Internet access as a human right.12 Still, even in the absence of

9. Many of the events and topics discussed in this Note also raise serious human rights concerns
related to privacy; torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; arbitrary detention; and other
fundamental rights. An examination of those rights is beyond the scope of this Note, which will focus
primarily on principles of freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of association,
nondiscrimination, and corporate responsibility.
10. See Frank La Rue (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion
and Expression, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. A/66/290 (Aug. 10, 2011) [hereinafter La Rue, August 2011 Report].
11. See id.
12. Government bodies in Estonia, France, and Costa Rica have declared Internet access a right.
See Frank La Rue (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 65, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) [hereinafter La
Rue, May 2011 Report]. Furthermore, an Internet connection of at least one megabyte per second has
been guaranteed in Finland, see id., and Spain, see Sarah Morris, Spain Govt to Guarantee Legal Right
to Broadband, REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2009, 1:26 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/17/spaintelecoms-idUSLH61554320091117. The Greek Constitution also preserves a right to “participate in the
Information Society,” and the government has an obligation to facilitate “access to electronically
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a baseline obligation requiring governments to provide their citizens with
access to the Internet, use of the Internet is protected within the existing
human rights framework in a variety of circumstances. This Note will use
the Egyptian Arab Spring to illustrate a number of ways in which freedom
of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of association protect the
use of the Internet and social media.
A. Freedom of Expression
The Internet has facilitated a dramatic expansion of new forms of
media and information. The Special Rapporteur emphasized that “[v]ery
few if any developments in information technologies have had such a
revolutionary effect as the creation of the Internet,”13 alluding to the
importance of an equally progressive expansion in freedom of expression.
For example, the Internet allows for instant, interactive communication
generated by any individual and directed at any audience. Indeed, “with the
advent of . . . intermediary platforms that facilitate participatory
information sharing and collaboration in the creation of content, individuals
are no longer passive recipients, but also active publishers of
information.”14 Accordingly, any individual can participate in “citizen
journalism” by publishing her own observations, pictures, and videos to a
global audience.15 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in a 2010 address on
Internet freedom, recognized that modern freedom of expression is “no
longer defined solely by whether citizens can go into the town square and
criticize their government without fear of retribution. Blogs, emails, social
networks, and text messages have opened up new forums for exchanging
ideas, and created new targets for censorship.”16
Egyptians harnessed new information platforms both before and
during the Arab Spring protests. Thousands of blogs documenting
corruption and brutality effected by the Mubarak regime existed years
before Mubarak’s eventual overthrow, and the number increased
dramatically in the period leading up to the January 25 revolution.17
transmitted information, as well as . . . the production, exchange and diffusion thereof.” 2008
SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5A.
13. La Rue, May 2011 Report, supra note 12, ¶ 19.
14. Id.
15. See MOLLY LAND ET AL., WORLD BANK, #ICT4HR: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 13–14 (2012).
16. Hillary Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom (Jan. 21, 2010), http://
www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.
17. See Emad El-Din Shahin, The Egyptian Revolution: The Power of Mass Mobilization and the
Spirit of Tahrir Square, in REVOLUTION, REVOLT, AND REFORM IN NORTH AFRICA: THE ARAB SPRING
AND BEYOND 70, 84 (Ricardo René Larémont ed., 2014).
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Websites run by regular citizens, news organizations, and banned political
parties created a new political space for criticizing the government,
investigating human rights abuses, and spreading democratic ideals.
Relatedly, Facebook became a major platform for political discourse.18
New technology also served to connect Egypt to the international
community. Twitter, by facilitating real-time conversations about
government actions, protestors’ demands, and turnout at demonstrations,
allowed the rest of the world to observe the movement as it unfolded and
engage with activists by commenting and showing support.19
As evidenced by the innovative tools used by Egyptian activists, the
development of the Internet has had a profound impact on the scope of the
basic right to freedom of expression, which was first internationally
recognized in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).20
That the UDHR’s drafters likely could not have imagined the technologies
that facilitate the present-day freedom of expression is of no moment; they
protected a broad right “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.”21
The same right to freedom of expression is enshrined the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a legally binding treaty
ratified by Egypt in 1982.22 Echoing the UDHR, the ICCPR also provides
for freedom of expression through “any other media,” and the UN Human
Rights Committee has expressly interpreted protected expression to include
“all forms of audio-visual as well as electronic and internet-based modes of
18. See Philip N. Howard et al., Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media
During the Arab Spring? 17 (Project on Info. Tech. & Political Islam, Univ. of Wash., Working Paper
No. 2011.1, 2011), available for download at http://philhoward.org/opening-closed-regimes-what-wasthe-role-of-social-media-during-the-arab-spring/.
19. See id. at 16.
20. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR], art. 19 (Dec. 10,
1948) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression . . . .”).
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Article 19 provides:
(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing or in print, in the form of in the form of art, or through any other media of his
choice.
(3) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special
duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these
shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of
public health or morals.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] art. 19, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. No.
E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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expression.”23 In ratifying the ICCPR, States enter into a contractual
relationship with other State parties to uphold their enumerated human
rights commitments. Thus, the Egyptian government’s decision to shut
down the Internet and effectively eliminate a major platform for sharing
opinions and exchanging information violated it legal obligation to “respect
and ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the [ICCPR].”24
Despite ensuring the openness of expression through media, the
ICCPR identifies several exceptional circumstances during which
expression may be legitimately restricted.25 According to the Special
Rapporteur, any government-sanctioned limitation on expression must pass
a three-part, cumulative test:
(a) It must be provided by law, which is clear and accessible to
everyone (principles of predictability and transparency); and
(b) It must pursue one of the purposes set out in article 19, paragraph 3
of the [ICCPR], namely (i) to protect the rights or reputation of
others, or (ii) to protect national security or of public order, or of
public health or morals (principle of legitimacy); and
(c) It must be proven as necessary and the least restrictive means
required to achieve the purported aim (principles of necessity and
proportionality).26

These requirements are construed narrowly, and the body imposing the
limitation on freedom of expression must satisfy each in turn.
To meet the first requirement, the limitation must take the form of a
formally-adopted law which is accessible to the public and “formulated
with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her
conduct accordingly.”27 The Egyptian government gave no official
justification for its decision to sever the nation’s Internet connection,28 but
its pre-existing laws shed light on the purported legality of the action.
Egypt’s Emergency Law, for example, authorizes security agencies to

23. See Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34,
(Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter General Comment No. 34].
24. ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 2(1).
25. See id. art. 19(3). Note, however, that the ICCPR “permits no exception or restriction” with
respect to the right to freedom of opinion. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General
Comment No. 10, at 18, U.N. Doc. E/1999/22 (Dec. 1, 1988).
26. La Rue, May 2011 Report, supra note 12, ¶ 24.
27. General Comment No. 34, supra note 23, ¶ 25.
28. See, e.g., Gerbaudo, supra note 1, at 34.
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undertake a range of censorship and communications monitoring.29 While
certain justifiable human rights derogations are anticipated by the ICCPR
in times of public emergency,30 the standard for invoking this procedure is
exceptionally high. The emergency must be of a character “which threatens
the life of the nation,” and States must carefully justify their actions,
subject to review by the UN Human Rights Committee and monitoring by
other States parties.31 Moreover, derogations must be temporary, with the
goal of restoring “a state of normalcy” wherein full observance of
international human rights can once again be secured.32
In contrast with the ICCPR’s strict criteria for what constitutes a
legitimate state of emergency, at the time of the Arab Spring, Egypt had
been operating under emergency law almost continuously for over fifty
years.33 The justification for the state of emergency included a number of
permanent “destabilizing factors” thought to threaten Egypt’s national
security,34 and a presidential decree renewing the Emergency Law in May
2010 stated that enforcement “will be limited to cases of combatting the
dangers of terrorism and its finance and the purchase, export and
trafficking in narcotics.”35 The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion
and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering
terrorism has urged Egypt to withdraw its state of emergency and expressed
consistent concern with the legislation both before and after the Arab
Spring uprisings.36 As he put it: “A state of emergency almost continuously
in force for more than 50 years in Egypt is not a state of exceptionality; it

29. See FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2011: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF INTERNET
AND DIGITAL MEDIA 123 (2011).

30. ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 4(1).
31. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 29, ¶¶ 3, 10, 17, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001) (noting that “[n]ot every disturbance or catastrophe qualifies
as a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation,” and that an armed conflict will not
necessarily be enough to trigger the provision).
32. Id. ¶ 1.
33. See Martin Scheinin (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism), Mission to Egypt, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc
A/HRC/13/37/Add.2 (Oct. 14, 2009); Ben Emmerson (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism), Addendum –
Follow-Up Report to Country Missions, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc A/HRC/20/14/Add.2 (June 15, 2012); Caitlin
Dewey, What it Means That Egypt is Entering a ‘State of Emergency’, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/08/14/what-it-means-that-egypt-isentering-a-state-of-emergency/.
34. Scheinin, supra note 33, ¶ 5 (outlining factors related to terrorism, such as the activities of
Hizbullah and Al-Qaida, Egypt’s proximity to Gaza, and the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt).
35. Emmerson, supra note 33, ¶ 6.
36. See Scheinin, supra note 33, ¶¶ 5–8, 49; Emmerson, supra note 33, ¶¶ 5–9.
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has become the norm, which must never be the purpose of a state of
emergency.”37 Thus, in light of the Emergency Law’s broad scope, longstanding existence in force, and lack of connection to a specific threat to
the life of the nation, it is unlikely to qualify as a legitimate basis for
derogating fundamental human rights under ICCPR Article 4, and likewise
does not provide a permissible legal basis for limiting freedom of
expression under ICCPR Article 19.
Next, to satisfy the second requirement, the limitation must fall within
two narrow aims—respect for the human rights or reputation of others, or
protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.
Mubarak likely would have justified his actions as protecting public order
and the rights of pro-government Egyptians. However, the state of the
demonstrations did not support this as a legitimate purpose because the
protesters continuously stressed the peaceful nature of the
demonstrations,38 and the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s outlawed Islamic
opposition group, did not officially participate in the movement.39
Furthermore, official government propaganda denied even the existence of
the demonstrations,40 undermining any strong claim for the legitimacy of
its actions.
The purposes enumerated in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR are generally
meant to address much more serious situations than large civilian protests
demanding democratic change. Legitimate restrictions are usually limited
to instances involving child pornography; hate speech; defamation; direct
and public incitement to commit genocide; advocacy of national, racial, or
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination; hostility or
violence; and incitement to terrorism.41 Given the circumstances leading up
to the Internet shutdown, and considering the government’s failure to
provide any explanation for its actions, the Egyptian government’s action
also fails to meet the second requirement of the Special Rapporteur’s test.
Finally, to fulfill the third requirement, the restriction “must be
necessary for a legitimate purpose”42 and “the least intrusive instrument

37. Scheinin, supra note 33, ¶ 6.
38. See Shahin, supra note 17, at 85.
39. See Kareem Fahim, Violent Clashes Mark Protests Against Mubarak’s Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/world/middleeast/26egypt.html?pagewanted=all.
40. See Gerbaudo, supra note 1, at 35.
41. See La Rue, May 2011 Report, supra note 12, ¶ 25; see also La Rue, August 2011 Report,
supra note 10, ¶¶ 20–36.
42. General Comment No. 34, supra note 23, ¶ 33 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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amongst those which might achieve their protective function.”43 In this
case, even had the crisis been as Mubarak perceived, disconnecting the
Internet and mobile phone networks for days was not a proportionate
response. While perhaps intended to discourage the mobilization and
association of protesters, the communication blackout extended much
further, blocking calls for emergency medical assistance and impeding
routine business communications.44 Moreover, the action did not even
achieve its aim of suppressing the demonstrations. Rather, it had an inverse
effect, mobilizing more Egyptians in opposition to the government.45 And
yet the Internet remained disconnected for five days. Mubarak’s response
was not necessary, nor was it the least restrictive means to achieve a
legitimate aim, failing the third requirement of the Special Rapporteur’s
test. Instead, it appears that Mubarak’s true motivation was to restrict the
type of speech that the Special Rapporteur warns should never be limited:
“discussion of Government policies and political debate; reporting on
human rights; Government activities and corruption in Government; . . .
peaceful demonstrations or political activities, including for . . . democracy;
and expression of opinion and dissent.”46
B. Freedom of the Press
The ICCPR protects the right to “seek, receive and impart information
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers.”47 The dual nature of this
right emphasizes that both the individual’s right to seek and receive
information and the media’s right to impart such information are protected.
Indeed, the UN Human Rights Committee emphasizes that protected
expression includes journalism, political discourse, commentary on public
affairs, and discussion of human rights.48
Egypt had a history of censoring the media long before the Arab
Spring protests began. Before the 1990s, broadcast media was highly
censored and media outlets were primarily dominated by the government.49
Following a wave of media privatization, Egyptian press laws were updated
in 2006, allowing international and non-Egyptian news sources to gain

43. Id. ¶ 34 (quoting Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 27, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, (Nov. 2, 1999)).
44. See Gerbaudo, supra note 1, at 34.
45. Id. at 33–35.
46. La Rue, August 2011 Report, supra note 10, ¶ 42.
47. ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 19(2).
48. See General Comment No. 34, supra note 23, ¶ 11.
49. See PHILIP N. HOWARD & MUZAMMIL M. HUSSAIN, DEMOCRACY’S FOURTH WAVE?:
DIGITAL MEDIA AND THE ARAB SPRING 93–94 (2013).
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access to the country.50 While this allowed a previously isolated society to
connect with the outside world, domestic sources continued to be heavily
influenced by official government versions of the public narrative.51 The
introduction of the Internet facilitated a flourishing online civil society; for
the first time citizens could access new, diverse political information and
uncensored international news. This encouraged a new public platform for
discussion. Indeed, “[f]or citizens whose political discussions were often
marginalized to the safety of the private sphere, online discussion spaces
allowed for more autonomous and semi-public political discussions and
public opinion formation.”52
Citizen journalists worked in concert with official news sources, also
predating the January 2011 protests. One study, analyzing Egyptian online
forums in 2006, noted that users reviewed and debated almost every news
event that year.53 Bloggers held a unique position: “[f]ree from the
institutional constraints of news organizations, digital activists [were] free
to reshape and repackage news information with their personalized
interpretations and motivating messages for sympathetic audiences.”54 In
some cases, civilian journalism was incorporated by official news sources.
For example, as the Arab Spring was unfolding, Al Jazeera employed usergenerated content in blogs and live updates that were published alongside
fact-verified in-depth articles.55
Mubarak’s Internet shutdown prevented Egyptians from accessing and
contributing to online news and information sources. The lack of
connectivity acted as a severe impediment to seeking, receiving, and
imparting ideas that originated both in Egypt and abroad. The impact was
especially severe due to the nation’s tradition of reliance on online news
sources. Even notwithstanding the media censorship leading up to the
January 28, 2011 Internet blackout, an act with such a profound chilling
effect on information sharing implicates the right to freedom of expression
as required by the ICCPR and Egypt’s ratification of the instrument.
Equally problematic were the regime’s attacks on citizen journalists
and bloggers, which increased in frequency during the January 2011
protests. The Special Rapporteur underscored that targeting individuals to
silence legitimate expression or spread intimidation is intolerable, even

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id. at 94.
See id.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 97–98.
Id. at 97.
See id. at 100.
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when the targets are Internet users.56 Nonetheless, government officials
repeatedly arrested, detained, interrogated, and tortured Egyptians who
blogged or used social media to share messages criticizing the government.
Wael Ghonim, the administrator of a popular Facebook group,57 was the
target of one such attack. Despite posting anonymously, Ghonim was
arrested on January 28, 2011, interrogated, and detained for eleven days.58
This type of State action can only qualify as a permissible,
proportionate restriction on freedom of expression in very rare cases.59 To
uphold its international commitment, Egypt would have to demonstrate
that: “(a) the expression [was] intended to incite imminent violence; (b) it
[was] likely to incite such violence, and (c) there [was] a direct and
immediate connection between the expression and the likelihood or
occurrence of such violence.”60 Wael Ghonim, like many of his fellow
cyberactivists, used the Internet to spread information, advocate for
government accountability and transparency, and mobilize support for
peaceful demonstrations.61 Far from inciting violence or bringing about a
state of emergency, the Egyptian bloggers and citizen journalists merely
threatened the government’s self-perception of infallibility.
C. Freedom of Association and the Right of Peaceful Assembly
Another development facilitated by the advent of the Internet was the
creation of new spaces for associating with like-minded individuals.
Freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association are provided for
in both the UDHR62 and the ICCPR.63 Traditionally, these rights related to
associating with groups such as labor unions, political parties, and religious
groups, as well as meeting and demonstrating publicly. As with the
freedom of expression, the ICCPR allows for restricting the right to free
association when necessary to protect national security, public order, public
health, and the rights and freedoms of others.64
Virtual connectivity has significantly expanded the means by which
individuals can associate and assemble. The Internet has created a space for

56. La Rue, May 2011 Report, supra note 12, ¶ 33.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 68–70.
58. See Wael Ghonim: Creating a ‘Revolution 2.0’ in Egypt, NPR (Feb. 9, 2012, 1:32 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2012/02/09/146636605/wael-ghonim-creating-a-revolution-2-0-in-egypt.
59. See ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 19(3).
60. La Rue, May 2011 Report, supra note 12, ¶ 36.
61. See Wael Ghonim: Creating a ‘Revolution 2.0’ in Egypt, supra note 58.
62. See UDHR, supra note 20, art. 20.
63. See ICCPR, supra note 22, arts. 21–22.
64. See id.
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people to find and connect with others, free from the geographical,
temporal, or logistical constraints that confine offline associations. Indeed,
Secretary of State Clinton called the Internet “the public space of the 21st
century—the world’s town square, classroom, marketplace, coffeehouse,
and nightclub.”65 This phenomenon can be explained by the enhanced
capacity for network-building provided by online tools:
Email and the Internet are not merely additional channels or spaces
extending the boundaries of freedom of association and assembly into
cyberspace. They allow for forms of association and assembly that were
previously not possible, going beyond mere virtual equivalents of
physical association and assembly to a new integration of information,
communication, expression, association, and assembly, enabled by
[information and communication technologies], that are sometimes
referred to as “online communities.”66

Furthermore, the combination of these new “communities” with offline
activism and political ideas has sparked a form of “cyberactivism,” with a
greater capacity for organization and a larger reach than traditional offline
social movements.67
Egyptian activists during the Arab Spring provide a striking,
successful example of cyberactivism. Facebook became a tremendous
platform for protestor mobilization. In June 2010, Wael Ghonim, a wellknown activist, created a Facebook group called We are All Khaled Said to
memorialize a young Egyptian blogger who was allegedly beaten to death
after reporting on police corruption.68 By sharing pictures of the beaten
man, the webpage first became a “portal for collective commiseration,” and
quickly turned into a “logistical tool and . . . a very strong source of
community.”69 In the period leading up to the main protest day—January
65. Hillary Clinton, Sec’y of State, Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices and Challenges in a
Networked World (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/02/1566
19.htm.
66. Charley Lewis, The Right of Assembly and Freedom of Association in the Information Age, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY 151, 159 (Rikke Frank Jørgensen ed., 2006).
67. See id. at 160; see also Tim Eaton, Internet Activism and the Egyptian Uprisings:
Transforming Online Dissent into the Offline World, WESTMINSTER PAPERS COMM. & CULTURE, April
2013, at 3, 7 (“[A] Facebook . . . user’s created content is disseminated to his/her ‘friends’ or
‘followers’ who can then choose to comment on it or forward it, at which point the information is then
transmitted to their networks. This permits the creation of networks of trust . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
68. See Kamal Sedra, The Role of Social Media & Networking in Post-Conflict Settings: LessonsLearned From Egypt 3 (paper presented at the World Bank/Transitional Demobilization &
Reintegration Program Afr. Dev. Bank Conference, Tunis, Tunis., June 5–6, 2013), http://
www.tdrp.net/PDFs/Social%20Media%20&%20Arab%20Spring%20-%20Egypt.pdf.
69. See HOWARD & HUSSAIN, supra note 49, at 21.
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25, 2011—the group had amassed 400,000 members and provided a forum
for circulating calls for protests and instructions to demonstrators.70 Rather
than causing the protests, Facebook and other online platforms served as
digital headquarters during the movement, providing a critical space for
logistical planning. In this sense, “activists were able to organize because
they had been taking part in identifying and discussing shared grievances
and nurturing tactics for political action.”71
Instead of encouraging civilian activism and political discourse, the
Egyptian government’s response was first to block Facebook and other
social networking sites, and later to orchestrate a full-scale disruption of
Internet connectivity.72 With respect to freedom of assembly and
association, this created an organizational headache for protestors, but
failed to actually prevent Egyptians from demonstrating. In fact, protesters
quickly adapted, planning their actions ahead of time and scheduling future
events to compensate for their lack of real-time connectivity.73
Furthermore, the Internet blackout prompted many Egyptians to take to the
streets and locate their friends and family, rather than following the protests
from behind their computer screens.74
While demonstrators proved resilient when faced with a loss of
Internet connectivity, the Egyptian government circumscribed its citizens’
right to freedom of assembly and association by shutting down the Internet.
The Special Rapporteur expressed particular concern with the emerging
trend of “just-in-time” blocking, used “to prevent users from accessing or
disseminating information at key political moments.”75 In this sense,
Internet users are barred from mobilizing online and exchanging
information at times when their association and expression have the most
influence. In Mubarak’s case, it was an attempt to quiet the protests and
fragment the civilian movement—far from the specific circumstances that
could justify a State curtailing freedom of association and the right to
peaceful assembly.76

70. See Shahin, supra note 17, at 83. Today, the page has over four million “likes.” See كلن ا خال د
[ س عيدWe Are All Khaled Said], FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed (last visited Nov.
9, 2014).
71. HOWARD & HUSSAIN, supra note 49, at 97.
72. See, e.g., Anne Alexander, Internet Role in Egypt’s Protests, BBC (Feb. 9, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12400319.
73. See Shahin, supra note 17, at 88.
74. See HOWARD & HUSSAIN, supra note 49, at 22.
75. La Rue, May 2011 Report, supra note 12, ¶ 30.
76. See ICCPR, supra note 22, arts. 21–22.
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III. INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS: EQUALITY IMPACTS OF THE
PROLIFERATION OF THE INTERNET
While the Internet and social networks enable self-empowerment
through expression and shared information, they also present barriers with
respect to access to connectivity and the tools to engage in the online
community. Indeed, the “digital divide refers to the gap between people
with effective access to digital and information technologies . . . and those
with very limited or no access at all.”77 Digital divides exist not only
between developed and developing States, but also “along wealth, gender,
geographical and social lines within States.”78
Because the Internet is such a powerful rights-enabling tool, access or
the lack thereof can both diminish and exacerbate inequalities within a
particular society. The ability to use online tools requires not only an
Internet connection, but also access to a computer or mobile phone, a
familiarity with how to use online tools, a knowledge of what tools exist,
and in many cases, a basic level of literacy.79 In this sense, new
technologies can reinforce existing inequalities by elevating the barriers
between social groups.
On the one hand, the use of social media in Egypt during the Arab
Spring presents an example of social divisions—Internet users were a
comparatively small portion of the population, and overwhelmingly young
and technologically-savvy. On the other hand, however, it also served as a
uniting force: online tools proved to be an equalizer between men and
women, and the movement that began on the Internet eventually moved to
the streets, where it welcomed members from all levels of society. This
Note will first consider the demographics of the Egyptian population which
utilized the Internet during the revolution. It will then analyze the role of
the Internet as a tool promoting equality between Egyptian men and
women, and identify the discriminatory consequences of the Internet
shutdown on women. Finally, this Note will discuss HarassMap as a
specific example of how online tools were used to empower Egyptian
women.

77. La Rue, May 2011 Report, supra note 12, ¶ 61.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., LAND ET AL., supra note 15, at 25–26; Jamie F. Metzl, Information Technology and
Human Rights, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 705, 717 (1996).
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A. Social Divisions: Internet User Demographics
In the decade leading up to the Arab Spring protests, technology
spread rapidly in the Arab world.80 Because of this, a solid faction of
Egyptian society was technologically literate, actively using digital media
and social networks long before the January 2011 movement. As one
analyst pointed out, “[d]igital media became a proximate cause of the
political revolution precisely because a significant community of users was
already comfortable using digital media before the crisis began.”81
Nonetheless, this trend was not uniform across geographical and
generational lines. Rather, Internet users tended to be more prevalent in
large cities,82 among the middle-class,83 and were generally concentrated
among a younger demographic.84
To illustrate, Internet users in Egypt consisted of 31.4% and 39.8% of
the population in 2010 and 2011, respectively.85 But within the “Internetsavvy” population, some 70% were under the age of thirty-four.86 While a
significant segment of the population was disconnected from the online
community, the technologically literate youth demographic proved to be a
driving force behind the Egyptian Arab Spring movement. The correlation
is not surprising: “the people [with Internet access]—urban dwellers,
educated elites, and the young—are precisely the population with the
capacity to enable regime change.”87 In other words, they were those with
the ability to articulate their grievances and demands, mobilize support, and
organize dissent.
Although the Egyptian youth organized the Arab Spring revolution,
they welcomed all other groups seeking to join the movement, thereby
diminishing the potential discriminatory effect caused by the digital divide.
Indeed, while social media helped mobilize thousands of protestors on
January 25, they “were immediately joined by hundreds of thousands of
angry Egyptians, who spontaneously embraced the young organizers and

80. See HOWARD & HUSSAIN, supra note 49, at 27.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., id. at 22 (“The people most affected [by the disruption in Internet service] were
middle-class Egyptians, who were cut off from internet service at home.”).
84. See Mohamed Ben Moussa, From Arab Street to Social Movements: Re-Theorizing Collective
Action and the Role of Social Media in the Arab Spring, WESTMINSTER PAPERS COMM. & CULTURE,
April 2013, at 47, 56.
85. See Internet Users (Per 100 People), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
IT.NET.USER.P2 (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
86. See Howard et al., supra note 18, at 6 (analyzing data compiled in 2011).
87. HOWARD & HUSSAIN, supra note 49, at 86–87.
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their calls for economic and social justice, freedom, and dignity.”88 The
uniting platform that the protesters embraced was inclusive enough to
bridge the gap between those with Internet access and those without. The
diversity of social groups represented in Tahrir Square is particularly
striking when considering the young smartphone-wielding generation
demonstrating alongside the group of middle-aged “improvised artists,”
observed by one anthropologist as hailing from the poorest neighborhoods,
unfamiliar with the Internet, and lacking affiliation to any particular activist
movement.89
B. Equalizing Forces and Discriminatory Consequences
Among the Egyptian population with access to the Internet, online
tools diminished gender barriers and empowered women to take an active
role in the Arab Spring protests. Although the ICCPR requires States to
protect rights equally with respect to both men and women,90 Egypt’s
conservative society has a history of gendered divisions, including
prevalent violence against women and the overwhelming exclusion of
women from politics.91 Nonetheless, even before the January 2011
movement, the Internet became a forum where gender dynamics began to
liberalize.
For example, one scholar articulated several ways in which digital
media has helped empower women in conservative Muslim societies:
First, digital media are allowing citizens to learn about the status of
women and gender relations in other countries. Second, they also allow
both men and women to debate specific gender issues relevant in their
own cultures. Third, the arrival of digital media in many Muslim
communities and households has become an occasion for renegotiating
and restructuring gender relationships. Finally, the internet supports
women-only online communities, which have become sites for political
conversation away from both patriarchal leaders and the public gaze of
journalists.92

88. Shahin, supra note 17, at 84.
89. See Paola Abenante, Tahrir as Heterotopia: Spaces and Aesthetics of the Egyptian
Revolution, in ARAB SPRING: UPRISINGS, POWERS, INTERVENTIONS 21, 26 (Kjetil Fosshagen ed., 2014).
90. See ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 3 (“The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to
ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the
present Covenant.”).
91. See Isobel Coleman, Women and the Arab Revolts, BROWN J. WORLD AFF., Fall/Winter 2011,
at 215, 219. See generally Hania Sholkamy, Women Are Also Part of This Revolution, in ARAB SPRING
IN EGYPT: REVOLUTION AND BEYOND, supra note 8, at 153.
92. HOWARD & HUSSAIN, supra note 49, at 62–63 (citation omitted).
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In Egypt, women took the trend a step further by actively engaging with the
greater political discourse through blogs and forums, and by building up a
widespread presence on social networks.
Data from 2011 indicate that 36% of Egypt’s Facebook population
was female, while 33% of Egyptians active on Twitter during the protests
were women.93 While these numbers admittedly translate to a ratio of about
two men for every woman using social media, they still represent a
significant increase in representation when compared to statistics reflecting
female representation in traditional media. In general, women are
underrepresented: “[w]omen constitute less than a quarter (24 percent) of
the people heard or read about in print, radio and television news across the
world.”94 Furthermore, a 2012 study analyzing one hundred Arab media
outlets revealed they were overwhelmingly “silent about women.”95 In this
sense, online platforms emerged as considerably more accessible means for
Egyptian women to contribute their voices to the traditionally maledominated social and political commentary.
In the time surrounding the January 2011 uprisings, women actively
participated in the protests, both online and in person. Free from the
constraints of tradition and conservatism that existed in the offline world,
“[b]logs, news organization websites, Twitter feeds, and political listservs
[were] where many women debate[d] on equal footing with men, where
policy alternatives [were] discussed, and where regime secrets [were]
exposed.”96 Indeed, several women emerged as prominent bloggers and
online activists during the Egyptian Arab Spring, and succeeded in
mobilizing and inspiring thousands of their fellow citizens. Twenty-five
year old Asmaa Mahfouz, for example, was a founding member of the
April 6 Movement, the first Egyptian online protest movement. Mahfouz
posted a video of herself declaring her intent to take to the streets and
protest on January 25,97 and in doing so, inspired others—both female and

93. See id. at 48.
94. U.N. EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG. [UNESCO], WORLD TRENDS IN FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND MEDIA DEVELOPMENT 61 (2014), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002270/
227025e.pdf.
95. Id. (citing the Arab Women in Arab News study, and noting that out of one hundred media
outlets analyzed, a mere six accounted for 63% of all female references, with the remaining totaling less
than 1% of female references).
96. HOWARD & HUSSAIN, supra note 49, at 26.
97. See Asmaa Mahfouz & the YouTube Video That Helped Spark the Egyptian Uprising,
DEMOCRACY NOW! (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.democracynow.org/2011/2/8/asmaa_mahfouz_the_you
tube_video_that.
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male—to post videos and pictures of themselves.98 Mahfouz’s video was
credited as one of the viral events that ultimately sparked the January 25
day of protests.99
But although online tools helped Egyptian women reclaim
fundamental human rights that had been severely restricted offline, they
also made women especially vulnerable to discriminatory effects of the
Internet shutdown. The principle of nondiscrimination is enshrined in the
ICCPR, which maintains that “all persons are equal before the law” and
requires States to “guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination.”100 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), ratified by Egypt in 1981,101
defines discrimination against women as:
[A]ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which
has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on
a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other
field.102

Prohibited discrimination includes acts or policies that are either directly or
indirectly discriminatory against women.103 Indirect discrimination
manifests through policies that are facially gender neutral, but which have a
discriminatory effect on women.104
Although the Mubarak regime’s Internet shutdown was an act
designed to sever the connectivity of all Internet users, irrespective of sex,
it had a particularly adverse effect on women, who relied on the Internet as
a means to exercise rights that were circumscribed in offline Egyptian

98. See Mona El-Naggar, Equal Rights Takes to the Barricades, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/02/world/middleeast/02iht-letter02.html?_r=0.
99. See id.
100. ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 26.
101. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
102. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW]
art. 1, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
103. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No.
28, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.2 (Oct. 19, 2010).
104. See, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 16, ¶ 13, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/2005/3 (May 13, 2005) (“This can occur, for example, when women are disadvantaged
compared to men with respect to the enjoyment of a particular opportunity or benefit due to pre-existing
inequalities.”).
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society. Rampant inequality in “real life” was countered by the “gender
equalizing” character of social media—men and women used social media
in the same ways and agreed that social media was a tool for women’s
empowerment.105 By removing access to this crucial forum enabling
women’s expression and autonomy, the Internet blackout further
exacerbated impermissible gender divisions, constituting a discriminatory
action prescribed by the ICCPR and CEDAW.
C. Case Study: Women’s Rights and HarassMap
One particularly inspiring element for many Egyptians during the
Arab Spring protests was the inclusiveness of the demonstrations. Citizens
were united by a communal desire for change, rather than by their
affiliation with a particular group or social class. Women stood shoulder to
shoulder with men, articulating demands, documenting events as they
unfolded, and lending aid to the injured.106 Sholkamy, an Egyptian
anthropologist, described the unifying power of the Arab Spring:
During the eighteen days of protest, a condition of near-communitas
prevailed on the streets and squares where people had congregated.
Sharing sleeping space and food, men and women bracketed their old
gender norms, as evinced, for example, by the total absence of sexual
harassment and the acceptance of women as equals in the face of the
autocracy that was about to be ruptured and decimated.107

Sholkamy’s observation is striking—almost unbelievable—when compared
to the prevalence of gender-based violence and harassment both before and
after the January 2011 movement.
A 2010 study conducted by the Egyptian Centre for Women’s Rights
illustrated the pre-revolution context: “Sexual harassment has become an
overwhelming and very real problem experienced by all women in
Egyptian society, often on a daily basis, in public places such as markets,
public transportation and the streets, as well as in private places such as
educational institutions, sports clubs, and the workplace.”108 The same
study announced that 83% of Egyptian women and 98% of foreign women

105. See DUBAI SCH. OF GOV’T, ARAB SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN
ARAB WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT 11 (2011), http://www.arabsocialmediareport.com/UserManagement/
PDF/ASMR%20Report%203.pdf.
106. See Sholkamy, supra note 91, at 154.
107. Id. at 155.
108. RASHA MOHAMMAD HASSAN, EGYPTIAN CTR. FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS, CLOUDS IN EGYPT’S
SKY: SEXUAL HARASSMENT: FROM VERBAL ASSAULT TO RAPE 13 (2010).
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in Egypt had experienced sexual harassment.109 Fast forward to 2013, when
the situation was described as an “epidemic of sexual violence” by Human
Rights Watch.110 A twenty-two year old Egyptian woman, who disguised
herself as a teenage boy to avoid sexual harassment, described the extent of
abuse in post-revolution Egypt:
The only thing that the attackers are interested in is that the target is a
woman . . . It does not matter if she is young or old, or what her
background might be—if you are female you are viewed as someone
who is worthy of punishment—these violations transcend politics. They
represent innate prejudice and hatred. The real problem is that they are
getting worse, and more frequent.111

Spurred by necessity, Egypt’s history of sexual harassment gave rise
to innovation in the age of widespread Internet usage. HarassMap is a
volunteer initiative, launched by four women in 2010, that uses
crowdsourcing technology, community mobilization, and communications
campaigns to “end[] the social acceptability of sexual assault and
harassment in Egypt.”112 The project uses Frontline SMS and Ushahidi
software to collect and map anonymous reports of sexual harassment.113
Victims and witnesses can submit information via SMS, the HarassMap
website, or social media.114 Whereas many Egyptian women were
marginalized into silence after experiencing sexual harassment,115 this
online tool gives women a voice, allowing them to effectively contribute
and receive information, starting a community dialogue about the problem.
Furthermore, the system is designed to automatically send a response to
each report, “telling victims how to access free services from NGOs:

109. Id. at 16.
110. Egypt: Epidemic of Sexual Violence, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 2, 2013), http://
www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/03/egypt-epidemic-sexual-violence.
111. Nabila Ramdani, Sexual Violence in Egypt: ‘The Target is a Woman’, GUARDIAN (July 9,
2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/09/sexual-violence-egypt-target-woman.
112. Who We Are, HARASSMAP, http://harassmap.org/en/who-we-are/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
113. How and Why We Began, HARASSMAP, http://harassmap.org/en/who-we-are/how-and-whywe-began/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
114. Hamza Shaban, Crowdsourcing Sexual-Assault Prevention, AM. PROSPECT (Feb. 12, 2013),
http://prospect.org/article/crowdsourcing-sexual-assault-prevention.
115. “97.6% of Egyptian women [who were victims or witnesses of sexual harassment] . . . did not
seek police assistance because they didn’t think it was important or because no one would help them.”
Furthermore, “[w]omen also confirmed that they did not report harassment because they feared an
impact on their reputation, and were afraid of the reactions of people around them were they to admit
they were harassed.” HASSAN, supra note 108, at 17.
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psychological counseling, free lawyers, how to make a police report, [and]
self-defense classes.”116
The Egyptian government’s Internet shutdown isolated women from
this information lifeline. Not only were they unable to report incidents of
sexual harassment, they also lacked the means to track where violence was
likely to occur. This enabled harassment and violence against women and
hindered the ability of victims to call for help on a mobile phone. In this
sense, the government deprived Egyptian women of a key form of
expression and information sharing, stripping them of the armor that helped
protect a particularly vulnerable demographic.
This discriminatory effect of the Internet blackout was not undermined
by the comradery between male and female protesters during the
demonstrations. Even though the January 2011 protests marked an
uncharacteristically subdued period of abuse against Egyptian women, the
harassment was not completely eradicated. In fact, a persistent theme in the
narrative of Egyptian inequality is sexual harassment and gendered
violence inflicted by police, the military, and other official State
authorities.117 This was no exception during the unifying demonstrations,118
highlighting the sustained need for access to HarassMap, even in times of
perceived safety. Indeed, HarassMap tallied only eight cases of sexual
harassment between January 25, 2011 and February 11, 2011, a piece of
data taken by some to lend support to the theory that women were safer
during this time.119 This application of the data, however, fails to take into
account that Egyptians lacked Internet access for at least five days during
that period, coupled with disconnected or extremely unreliable mobile
service, severely inhibiting their ability to even contact HarassMap.

116. Id.
117. See, e.g., HASSAN, supra note 108, at 16–17; Emily Dyer, Egypt’s Shame: Why Violence
Against Women Has Soared After Mubarak, FOREIGN AFF. (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.foreign
affairs.com/articles/140686/emily-dyer/egypts-shame; Mona Eltahawy, Op-Ed., Egypt Has a Sexual
Violence Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/21/opinion/monaeltahawy-egypts-sexual-violence.html.
118. See Paul Amar, Turning the Gendered Politics of the Security State Inside Out? Charging the
Police With Sexual Harassment in Egypt, 13 INT’L FEMINIST J. POL. 299, 300 (2011).
119. As a comparison, eighty-two cases were reported between January 7, 2011 and January 25,
2011. Serena Hollmeyer Taylor et al., “When She Stands Among Men”: Sexual Harassment of Women
at Political Protests in Cairo, January 2011 – August 2013, AL NAKHLAH: ONLINE J. ON SOUTHWEST
ASIA & ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION (June 10, 2014), http://alnakhlah.org/2014/06/10/when-she-standsamong-men-sexual-harassment-of-women-at-political-protests-in-cairo-january-2011-august-2013/#_ft
nref37.
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IV. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AGE OF NEW MEDIA
The proliferation of online tools and cyberactivism during the Arab
Spring highlights a new reliance on intermediaries, or “private corporations
which provide services and platforms that facilitate online communication
or transactions between third parties, including giving access to, hosting,
transmitting, and indexing content.”120 Intermediaries include Internet
service providers and companies offering online tools such as Facebook,
Twitter, blogging platforms, forums, and search engines.121 Given the way
that Egyptians harnessed the Internet to spread democratic ideals, connect
with likeminded groups, and mobilize protest support, it is clear that
intermediaries hold a great deal of responsibility in determining where their
services will be offered, to whom, under what conditions, and when their
services will be restricted or revoked.
In response to the growing role of intermediaries, the Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression noted that “the private sector has gained unprecedented
influence over individuals’ right to freedom of expression and access to
information.”122 Indeed, the intersection of private companies offering
Internet services with fundamental human rights such as freedom of
expression, freedom of the press and media, freedom of association, the
right to peaceful assembly, and others, prompts a series of questions: what
are the responsibilities of companies providing Internet services? How
should private companies respond when pressured by States to modify their
services? What is the role of the international community in monitoring and
responding to human rights breaches facilitated by private companies? This
Note will analyze each question through the lens of the Egyptian Arab
Spring revolution.
A. Sources of Corporate Responsibility
On the one hand, innovative online and mobile tools developed by
private companies have greatly facilitated the expansion of human rights by
providing new means for personal expression and empowerment. On the
other hand, however, many companies’ business strategies do not prioritize
the protection of human rights. Rather, they are motivated by profit and
seek to fulfill the minimum standard required to comply with the law.
Nonetheless, private companies are not free to be detached, irresponsible

120. La Rue, May 2011 Report, supra note 12, ¶ 38.
121. See id.
122. Id. ¶ 44.
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outsiders when it comes to human rights—important international
standards also apply to non-state actors.123
Although the traditional international human rights framework was
designed to reflect the concept of the State as the principal duty-bearer
obliged to promote and protect individual rights, a growing trend in
international human rights law recognizes that in some cases, non-state
actors such as corporations possess affirmative human rights obligations.124
The moral foundation for this view can be traced to the UDHR, which
states in its preamble that “every individual and every organ of society,
keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and
education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by
progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal
and effective recognition and observance.”125 Companies, as fundamental
elements of society, fall within the broad reach of the UDHR, and a number
of scholars, human rights instruments, NGOs, and UN officials have
construed the UDHR as applying to corporations.126
Apart from corporations’ social and moral obligations, a codified list
of universal human rights duties tailored to non-state actors has yet to be
created. This does not mean, however, that such obligations do not exist
and are not binding on businesses. Rather, according to Andrew Clapham,
a scholar at the forefront of the debate on human rights and non-state
actors, existing and newly developed international legal frameworks
provide potent evidence that corporations do indeed possess normative
duties to protect human rights.127 The legal procedures through which to
hold corporations accountable for violations of these duties are less welldeveloped, but “the absence of an international jurisdiction to try
corporations does not mean that transnational corporations cannot break
international law.”128 Moreover, a number of recent developments have
signaled that international human rights law as applied to corporations is
growing teeth.129

123. See generally ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS
195–270 (2006) (describing the various human rights obligations of corporations).
124. See id. at 1.
125. UDHR, supra note 20, pmbl.
126. See CLAPHAM, supra note 123, at 227–28.
127. See id. at 195–270; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations for Non-State Actors:
Where Are We Now?, in DOING PEACE THE RIGHT WAY: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
RELATIONS IN HONOUR OF LOUISE ARBOUR (Fannie Lafontaine & François Larocque eds., forthcoming
2015) (draft at 13–19), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2641390.
128. CLAPHAM, supra note 123, at 267.
129. See Clapham, supra note 127, at 13–19 (detailing several examples of binding human rights
principles pertaining to corporations in the fields of international criminal law, international investment
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Defining the contours of the human rights obligations of companies is
outside of the scope of this Note. For now, it is sufficient to recognize that
a growing school of thought—supported by slowly emerging international
practice—understands corporations to have an obligation to actively
respect, protect, and promote human rights both in the workplace and in the
wider community.130 This entails not only ensuring that a corporation does
not commit human rights abuses itself, but also that it contributes to rightsenhancing public policies and avoids complicity in the human rights of
other actors, such as State governments.131 While this framework continues
to gain traction, another more diluted interpretation of companies’ human
rights duties identifies their baseline obligation as a responsibility to
respect human rights.132 This “means that business enterprises should act
with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others and to address
adverse impacts with which they are involved.”133 Thus, regardless of
where the line is drawn, at a minimum there exists a corporate obligation to
observe and respect rights, directing companies to be continually mindful
of how corporate policies can interact and conflict with fundamental human
rights.
The Global Net Initiative (GNI), a multistakeholder organization
bringing together corporations, NGOs, investors, and academics, has
focused its attention on information and communications technology
companies and their role in the protection and advancement of privacy and
freedom of expression rights. Although the GNI is dependent on voluntary
participation and companies’ internal implementation of its principles,134 it
has been influential in clarifying a global corporate responsibility standard
in the Internet and technology fields. The GNI’s Principles on Freedom of
Expression and Privacy (Principles) outline the suggested human rights

law, and contract law in the context of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service
Providers).
130. See, e.g., CLAPHAM, supra note 123, at 218–25 (outlining the respect, protect, and promote
framework built into the 2000 United Nations Global Compact).
131. See id. at 218.
132. John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, ¶ 6,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011).
133. Id.
134. See generally Governance, Accounting and Learning Framework, GLOBAL NETWORK
INITIATIVE
[GNI],
https://globalnetworkinitiative.org//sites/default/files/GNI_-_Governance_
Accountability_Learning.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2014); Implementation Guidelines for the Principles
of Freedom of Expression and Privacy, GNI, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org//sites/default/files/
GNI_-_Implementation_Guidelines_1_.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2014) [hereinafter Implementation
Guidelines].
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commitments of member corporations,135 and can be viewed by
nonmembers as a template of best-practices.
Regarding freedom of expression, the Principles emphasize the need
for companies to “avoid or minimize the impact of government restrictions
on freedom of expression, including restrictions on . . . the opportunities for
users to create and communicate ideas and information.”136 Actions
companies can take include requesting clarification from the government
explaining the legal basis for restriction, interpreting the restriction so as to
protect freedom of expression, and in some cases using domestic or
international tribunals to challenge the government’s authority.137 The GNI
also promotes open communication between corporations and governments
to encourage governments to understand, respect, and implement policies
that uphold freedom of expression.138 In this way, information and
communication technology companies are encouraged to actively engage
with their local and international communities, while continuing to respect,
protect, and promote human rights in the absence of a legitimate legal basis
to implement an official demand to violate freedom of expression.
B. Responding to a Government Demand
Egypt’s Internet shutdown on January 28, 2011 was ordered by
government authorities, but implemented by telecommunications
companies. Vodafone, a London-based Internet and cellphone service
provider, is one of the largest such companies operating in Egypt, with
twenty-eight million subscribers in 2011.139 Soon after the service blackout,
Vodafone issued a statement, declaring that “[a]ll mobile operators in
Egypt have been instructed to suspend services in selected areas . . . Under
Egyptian legislation, the authorities have the right to issue such an order
and we are obliged to comply with it.”140 Vodafone and the two other major
service providers, France Telecom and Etisalat, complied with the
government’s order,141 resulting in a “90 percent drop in data traffic to and

135. See Principles of Freedom of Expression and Privacy, GNI, https://www.globalnetwork
initiative.org/sites/default/files/GNI_-_Principles_1_.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2014).
136. Id. at 2.
137. See Implementation Guidelines, supra note 134, at 5.
138. See id. at 8.
139. See Matt Richtel, Egypt Cuts off Most Internet and Cell Service, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/29/technology/internet/29cutoff.html?_r=0.
140. Tim Bradshaw, Condemnation Over Egypt’s Internet Shutdown, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011,
1:06 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/08dbe398-2abb-11e0-a2f3-00144feab49a.html#axzz3MO1I3d2n.
141. See Juliette Garside, Vodafone Under Fire for Bowing to Egyptian Pressure, GUARDIAN (July
26, 2011, 4:14 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/jul/26/vodafone-access-egyptshutdown.
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from Egypt.”142 The disruption in service lasted about five days143 and
successfully silenced the majority of Egyptians’ online communication and
expression.
In one of the few statements issued by the company, a Vodafone
chairman blamed its complicity on the operating licenses it holds in various
countries: “We have no discretion to negotiate variations. In every case . . .
network operators are subject to similar legal provisions to those used in
Egypt.”144 Regrettably, Vodafone did not provide public access to
information detailing the internal procedures it carried out upon receiving
the Egyptian government’s Internet shutdown request. Nonetheless, some
observations can be made about the actions companies should take when
facing similar human rights challenges.
On one end of the spectrum, corporations facing government pressures
to violate human rights can refuse to comply with the order and risk their
license to operate in a country such as Egypt—effectively yielding their
commercial interests to the interest of protecting human rights. This is an
admittedly bold corporate decision, but an emerging trend in corporate
responsibility indicates that businesses must avoid complicity in human
rights abuses committed by others, while actively taking steps to respect,
protect, and promote human rights.145 The concept of corporate complicity
has gained traction through UN best practices guidelines, corporate training
manuals, and NGO reports.146 Corporate social responsibility principles
developed by Amnesty International, for example, recommend “that
companies should establish procedures to ensure that all operations are
examined for their potential impact on human rights and safeguards to
ensure that company staff are never complicit in human rights abuses.”147
In some cases, the only option to avoid complicity in State-sponsored
human rights abuses may be to directly defy the order.
Another important strategy for companies is to anticipate and preempt
human rights issues that could arise by developing specific procedures to
address problematic government demands. This should include a process
for determining the source and legal basis of the government request, as

142. Richtel, supra note 139.
143. See Garside, supra note 141.
144. Id. (omission in original).
145. See supra Part IV.A; see generally Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate
Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 339 (2000) (describing three
impermissible types of corporate complicity: direct, beneficial, and silent complicity).
146. See CLAPHAM, supra note 123, at 220–25.
147. Id. at 222 (citing AMNESTY INT’L, HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES FOR COMPANIES (1998),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/148000/act700011998en.pdf).

4. CATTLE (DO NOT DELETE)

444

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

3/31/2016 10:05 AM

Vol 26:417

well as an outline of red flags which trigger “a pre-defined process to
follow, with fast-acting escalation to the most senior levels of the company
if there is a very high risk of large-scale human rights abuse.”148
Along the same lines, a related preventative tactic is to develop a crisis
protocol together with the government upon entering a foreign market.149
This communicates to government authorities the company’s commitment
to human rights and fosters a dialogue under more neutral conditions than
those surrounding events like the Arab Spring. Taking such steps is an
important component of the commitment to promote human rights, which
encourages corporations to contribute to the advancement of human rights
at the policy level and to use their influence to put pressure on governments
with respect to human rights issues.
Additionally, there are many informal ways that a company can resist
abusive governmental demands, and indeed, there is evidence that in
implementing the shutdown, some telecommunications engineers worked
slowly to intentionally delay the blackout.150 Finally, companies should
take action to remedy a human rights abuse after it has occurred. Vodafone
and two other major Internet service providers launched community
outreach programs in Egypt following the Arab Spring.151 This indicates, at
the very least, some official recognition of the negative consequences of
the companies’ actions, which is an important first step toward a
commitment to behave more responsibly to respect, protect, and promote
human rights in the future.
C. The Role of the International Community
Given that individual corporations may possess fewer means to protect
human rights than traditional State duty-bearers, an effective business and
human rights strategy should involve collaboration among companies,
stakeholders, industries, and geographic regions. A collaborative approach
serves not only to solidify universal norms on business and human rights,
but also allows other stakeholders to provide assistance when human rights
148. CHRIS TUPPEN, GNI, OPENING THE LINES: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY FROM
GOVERNMENTS AND TELECOMMUNICATION COMPANIES 19 (2013), http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/
sites/default/files/GNI_OpeningtheLines.pdf.
149. See, e.g., Garside, supra note 141 (“These should ensure users can make emergency calls at
all times, that calls and emails are not hacked, that networks are shut down for minutes or hours rather
than days and that carriers cannot be used to disseminate propaganda.”).
150. See HOWARD & HUSSAIN, supra note 49, at 22.
151. “Vodafone announced a $3 million 5-year commitment to eradicate illiteracy. Mobinil
announced the launch of its ‘hiring 200,000 hands’ initiative. Etisalat has announced a clean water
initiative.” Jeffrey Avina, The Evolution of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the Arab Spring,
67 MIDDLE E. J. 77, 82 (2013).
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abuses occur. The GNI advocates such a strategy, encouraging the sharing
of tools, resources, and information between member-companies.152
Moreover, the GNI seeks to promote a “global dialogue” about the
Principles, to engage companies, industry members, civil society groups,
human rights organizations, students, governments, and international
institutions.153
When severe human rights abuses are threatened or occur, the
obligation of the international community to intervene is not always clearly
defined. However, outside actors’ responses to the Arab Spring illustrate
both good and bad practices with respect to measures that can be taken to
respect and promote freedom of expression. First, some companies stepped
up to assist activists in circumventing the Internet blackout. This included
providing access to dial-up Internet networks outside Egypt,154 and
designing innovative means to allow Egyptians to continue to use Internet
tools in the absence of an Internet connection.155 Google and Twitter
collaborated to create Speak2Tweet, a service that allowed Egyptians to
tweet by calling a designated number and leaving a voicemail.156 The
phone messages were converted into text and published to Twitter with the
“#egypt” hashtag.157 Relatedly, a U.S. software developer released free
Egypt-specific versions of Android apps to help protestors maintain
anonymity.158 RedPhone and TextSecure provided end-to-end phone and
text-message encryption, protecting users’ privacy if their phones were
monitored, stolen, or seized.159 Additionally, Small World News, an
organization promoting citizen journalism, contributed to spreading
Egyptian voices by translating Arabic messages into English.160 These
actions are positive examples of corporate and NGO efforts to intervene
and foster freedom of expression, evidencing a growing recognition that
152. See Implementation Guidelines, supra note 134, at 9.
153. Id. at 8.
154. French Data Network gave free access to its dial-up network to “anyone with an analogue
land line that is capable of calling France.” Chloe Albanesius, Egypt Turns to Sole Provider, Dial-Up
for Internet Access, PC MAG. (Jan. 31, 2011, 1:12 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,237
8969,00.asp.
155. See Charles Arthur, Google and Twitter Launch Service Enabling Egyptians to Tweet by
Phone, GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2011, 3:01 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/feb/01/
google-twitter-egypt.
156. See id.
157. See id.; see also HOWARD & HUSSAIN, supra note 49, at 32.
158. Kim Zetter, Researcher Makes Free Phone and Text Encryption Available to Egypt, WIRED
(Feb. 10, 2011, 4:56 PM), http://www.wired.com/2011/02/redphone-enters-egypt.
159. See id.
160. See Arthur, supra note 155; see also ALIVE IN EGYPT: TRANSCRIBING THE VOICES OF EGYPT,
http://alive.in/egypt/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014).
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non-state actors have great capacity to respect, promote, and protect human
rights.
Another example of influential outside action is the U.S. government’s
funding of technology groups that develop tools for Internet users to
circumvent government controls.161 While federal agency funding of
organizations like The Tor Project and UltraReach preceded the Arab
Spring uprisings, North African activists nonetheless utilized the innovative
tools and the organizations were supportive in lending their services.162 In
general, the federal grants and contracts focused on tech firms that
provided means for avoiding online tracking by the government, or to
access government-blocked websites.163 By lessening the negative impacts
of the Egyptian government’s human rights violations, the State
Department’s active support of human rights supports the idea that freedom
of expression is an international concern.
In contrast, some technology companies seemed unaware of the
impact that their products and policies had on freedom of expression. As
previously discussed, online tools such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube
were utilized by Egyptian activists to spread democratic ideals, mobilize
support, and organize demonstrations164—uses that critically expanded the
scope of the social media sites. Unfortunately, however, some of these
companies failed to match the innovation of their users. An illustrative
example is the clash between Facebook’s user policies and some Egyptian
activists’ vital attempts to maintain anonymity: “Opposition leaders in
countries where political parties are illegal sometimes use pseudonyms to
avoid government harassment. But doing so on Facebook is a violation of
the company’s user agreement, and so the company actually shut down
some of the protest-group pages.”165 One way to combat such disconnects
between corporations and their consumers is by strengthening the
company’s commitment to human rights by working with peers and other
stakeholders to share best practices and stay abreast of new human rights
challenges. Google did so by becoming a member of the GNI in 2008;
Facebook, on the other hand, remained a mere “observer” for a year before
161. See Ian Shapira, U.S. Funding Tech Firms That Help Mideast Dissidents Evade Government
Censors, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/
03/09/AR2011030905716.html.
162. In Egypt, the number of daily sessions of Tor, the service offered by The Tor Project, was
recorded as 250 in December 2010 and spiked to about 2,500 in February 2011. Similarly, in the time
immediately prior to the January 2011 Internet shutdown, UltraReach logged almost eight million page
views from Egyptians using its product, UltraSurf. Id.
163. See id.
164. See supra Part II.
165. HOWARD & HUSSAIN, supra note 49, at 32.
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joining in 2013.166 Twitter and most major Internet service providers have
yet to make such a commitment.
V. CONCLUSION
As part of The New Yorker coverage of Egypt’s uprising, Malcolm
Gladwell expressed his utter apathy with respect to Egyptians’ use of social
media, insisting that the means that protestors use to communicate their
grievances matter far less than what motivates their rebellion in the first
place.167 Gladwell is a vocal skeptic of the role of social media in
effectuating meaningful social change, arguing that influential offline
activism challenges the status quo and relies on high-risk strategies.168 In
contrast, “Facebook activism succeeds not by motivating people to make a
real sacrifice but by motivating them to do the things that people do when
they are not motivated enough to make a real sacrifice”—such as “liking” a
Facebook page.169 Furthermore, Gladwell emphasizes that social media
movements are organized as flexible networks of individuals with loose
ties.170 Traditional activism, he argues, involves a hierarchical organization
with a central leader and participants with deep personal commitments to
the cause.171 According to Gladwell, this structural difference highlights
social media as a useful tool for sharing information, but falls short of
provoking systemic change or enhancing users’ skin in the game. In other
words, social media “makes it easier for activists to express themselves,
and harder for that expression to have any impact.”172
Gladwell correctly recognizes that the history of protests bringing
about social and political change greatly surpasses the comparative youth
of the Internet and social media.173 To emphasize his point, he reminds his
incredulous readers that “in the French Revolution the crowd in the streets
spoke to one another with that strange, today largely unknown instrument
known as the human voice.”174 The weakness in Gladwell’s broader
argument, however, stems from his failure to acknowledge that the Internet
166. See Facebook Joins the Global Network Initiative, GNI (May 22, 2013, 4:00 AM),
https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/news/facebook-joins-global-network-initiative.
167. Malcolm Gladwell, Does Egypt Need Twitter?, NEW YORKER (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.new
yorker.com/news/news-desk/does-egypt-need-twitter.
168. Malcolm Gladwell, Small Change, NEW YORKER (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2010/10/04/small-change-malcolm-gladwell.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Gladwell, supra note 167.
174. Id.
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is a powerful human rights-enabling tool, affording a virtual voice to those
whose “human voices” have been silenced by authoritarian leaders,
repressive local laws, harassment, and discrimination.
The revolutions in Egypt are distinguishable from Gladwell’s
examples of passive Facebook activism because in Egypt, the democratic
and human rights ideals motivating the movements were fundamentally
linked to the Internet. As we have seen, social media and the Internet
facilitated online expression, critical discussion, citizen journalism, access
to outside news sources, reporting on human rights abuses, association with
likeminded individuals, and women’s empowerment. Because Egyptian
Internet users relied on online tools to reclaim their essential human rights,
each formed the deep personal stake in the goals and values of the uprisings
identified by Gladwell to be an important characteristic of effective
activism. This profound personal connection to the movement also led to
high-risk activities by activists both offline and online.
While the Internet provides important means for furthering
fundamental human rights, it also presents unique challenges. FormerPresident Hosni Mubarak’s country-wide communications blackout is a
sobering example of the potential to manipulate the Internet to affect largescale human rights abuses. The scope and duration of the Internet shutdown
was the largest that the world had ever seen, and it raises serious concerns
about the possibility of similar such events occurring in the future. Since
Mubarak’s 2011 action, the Internet has been severed on a national scale in
a troubling number of instances, including in Syria,175 Libya,176 Sudan,177
Iraq,178 and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.179 Rather than let this
become the norm, the international community should identify the
countries that are most at risk for an Internet blackout and take measures to
prevent that possibility. The strongest way to do so is by strengthening the
global commitment to Internet-related human rights, engaging both State

175. Syrian Internet Back After 19-Hour Blackout, BBC (May 8, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-22447247.
176. Jim Cowie, What Libya Learned From Egypt, DYN RESEARCH (Mar. 5, 2011), http://
research.dyn.com/2011/03/what-libya-learned-from-egypt/.
177. Doug Madory, Internet Blackout in Sudan, DYN RESEARCH (Sept. 25, 2013), http://
research.dyn.com/2013/09/internet-blackout-sudan/.
178. Peter Micek, International Coalition to Iraq: Stop Shutting Down the Internet, ACCESS NOW
(July 9, 2015, 11:43 AM), https://www.accessnow.org/international-coalition-to-iraq-stop-shuttingdown-the-internet/.
179. DRC Halts Internet Access and Cellphone Services Amid Protests, COMM. TO PROTECT
JOURNALISTS (Jan. 22, 2015), https://cpj.org/2015/01/drc-halts-internet-access-and-cellphone-servicesa.php.
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and non-state actors in the quest, and bolstering international accountability
so violations do not go undetected and unaddressed.

